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BACK TO SPOT MARKETS?
Abstract
At the end of the 1990s European retailers had significantly
contributed to restructuring fresh agricultural product food chains
(meat, fruit and vegetables), and had turned away from spot markets
in order to create their own supply chains, based on private technical
requirements and verification systems usually managed from within
the firm. However, over the last few years a second type of system has
appeared, as the range of standards adopted by retailers has been
broadened to include generic standards common to several retailers. A
telling example of this new approach is provided by the EUREPGAP
protocol. In this paper we propose a theoretical analysis of this new
procedure and its possible impacts.
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Introduction
The food safety crises in the 1990s prompted the public
authorities to adapt domestic and international regulations related to
food safety and protection of consumer health. The agreements signed
under the aegis of the World Trade Organization (SPS - Sanitary and
Phyto-Sanitary) and the European Union (EU) thus strengthened the
verification mechanisms for international exchanges. The main aim of
these agreements was to reduce the number of non-tariff barriers while
also implementing appropriate tools designed to lower the level of risk
related to microbial pathogens, pesticide product residues and input
into agricultural production (Unnevehr 2003 and Henson 2004).
At the same time that the public authorities were upgrading
their regulations, the private operators, for their part, were seeking
ways to meet customer expectations in terms of food safety. This was
done by implementing private standards. As shown by numerous
studies, European retailers have strongly pursued this approach and
have played a central role in enhancing the safety of food chains. As
retailers are held accountable for any failings committed by their
suppliers first under the Food Safety Act in Great Britain and later by
EU regulations, they have had to apply a due diligence approach to the
production, storage and transportation of products (Marsden andWrigley, 1996). The EU program related to maximum residue levels
(MRL) of pesticides has played the same role and has enabled
governments to “name and shame” retailers selling products
containing residue levels higher than that of the standards defined by
the public authorities (Chan and King, 2000). Yet in many cases,
European retailers have exceeded the requirements imposed by public
regulations, and have developed private standards. Retailers have
adopted this approach in order to protect themselves against the
commercial fallout resulting from food safety crises and in some cases
to develop new store brands and differentiation strategies (Codron et
al, 2005).
The regulation of product safety under the control of retailers
was implemented in two main ways. As described in numerous
articles, the first way is based on the decreasing utilization of spot
markets, the increasing involvement of retailers in the processes of
their suppliers, and the establishment of relatively formalized
contractual relationships aimed at fostering stable relations with
producer organizations. As a result, the creation of vertical alliances
between producers, manufacturers and retailers has proven to be an
important mechanism in the regulation of agricultural product food
chains, with a view to ensuring food safety and quality characteristics.
Several examples may be put forward to illustrate these changes.
In Great Britain, Marks and Spencer (M&S) created its own
supply chains by directly concluding agreements with producer
groups. For example, the “M&S’ Select Beef Scheme” is designed to
provide consumers with products based on stringent requirements of
traceability and quality. Tests and experiments directly managed by
the retailer are regularly conducted. The resulting conclusions are used
to compare different consumer food consumption patterns, and
therefore serve to guide the action taken by suppliers. Inspections are
carried out on a regular basis directly on the farms in order to ensure
permanent verification of production conditions (Fearne, 1998).
Carrefour has adopted a similar approach through the creation
of its private Certification Chain Brands (“Filières Qualité Carrefour”)
which are now commercialized in the majority of the countries in
which this firm is present (e.g. France, Italy, Portugal). This action is
intended to structure the supply chain by obliging suppliers to meet
production requirements related to safety, quality and environmental
levels, which are more demanding than public regulations. In order to
encourage producers to adopt this system, Carrefour makes a
relatively formalized contractual  commitment, which provides price
and volume guarantees higher than the spot market. These approaches
have been studied in detail by Mazé (2003), Giraud-Héraud et al.
(2005), Bazoche et al. (2005).
Another illustration of this phenomenon is provided by Dolan
and Humphrey (2000) in the fruit sector. The relationships between
producers, importers and retailers in this sector underwent a profound
transformation in the 1990s. During this period retailers sought to
organize product flow in such a way as to optimize transportation,
storage and packaging conditions, from the producer to shelf-space.
Technical requirements were drawn up in order to effectively controlharvesting conditions and production scheduling. This pre-supposed
an efficient coordination of all the activities included in the supply
chain, as well as enhanced information exchanges, not only to
coordinate annual production plans, but also to manage day-to-day
adjustments in reaction to unexpected events. Inspection and
verification procedures were implemented to guarantee the recording
of all activities, product traceability and certain technical
characteristics, in particular the level of pesticide use. Relationships
within the supply chain were built with a long-term view, and even
sometimes based on the sharing of risks, with retailers undertaking to
pay retailers a fixed percentage of the final product’s price.
As demonstrated by these three examples, it was thus at the end
of the 1990s European retailers had significantly contributed to
restructuring fresh agricultural product food chains (meat, fruit and
vegetables), and had turned away from spot markets in order to create
their own supply chains, based on private technical requirements and
verification systems usually managed from within the firm.
However, over the last few years a second type of system has
appeared, as the range of standards adopted by retailers has been
broadened to include generic standards common to several retailers. A
telling example of this new approach is provided by the EUREPGAP
protocol, which was developed by a network of European retailers in
order to ensure production and supply best practices for fresh
agricultural products. This standard functions as a norm for the
certification and selection of suppliers, and imposes requirements
mainly related to safety risks (pesticides, contamination…). Unlike
private standards which are managed and verified by each individual
retailer, these generic standards are common to several retailers with
compliance regularly monitored by external certification and audit
organizations. As a result, retailers are much less involved in the
verification and supervision of producers.
The adoption of the EUREPGAP standard by an increasing
number of retailers could be interpreted as a step backwards in view of
the previous progress accomplished. It could also suggest that such
generic standards might replace the private standards of each
individual retailer, thereby inducing changes in the organizational
forms implemented in the 1990s. Indeed, one may wonder whether
external standards such as EUREPGAP could prompt retailers to
reduce the intensity of the relationships established in the food chains,
though without necessarily lessening the food quality and safety
standards which they intend to continue offering to their customers.
The process of increasing verification and the development of strong
interactions in vertical alliances between producers and retailers could
therefore be discontinued, thereby heralding a return to making
purchases on the spot market. In this case, the spot market would
henceforth provide the required food safety and quality guarantees.
Such a change would raise several issues. Firstly, how would it
be possible for a stable spot market to emerge that enabled retailers to
obtain products of a sufficiently high safety and quality level without
being obliged to enter into vertical relationships with their suppliers,
which were too restrictive? Secondly, when the external standardscreated by the retailers were ready to impose themselves on the
market, they might then replace the MQS defined by the public
authorities. What could be their impacts from the public point of
view?
As highlighted by Marsden (2002), the regulation of food
industry chains is now based on complex interactions between the
private initiatives taken by the retailers and the actions of the public
authorities aimed at ensuring minimum product quality and safety
standards. The aim of this article is to contribute to the study of these
interactions within the framework of the public/private regulation of
product safety and quality, which emerged in order to react to the
uncertainties and food safety crises having occurred over the last two
decades (Richardson, 2001).
1.  Economic Issues Raised by EUREPGAP Certification
The EUREPGAP standard (“European Retailers for Good
Agricultural Practices”) was created by a group of European retailers
(e.g. Tesco, Ahold, Sainsbury, Monoprix). This standard is used for
the certification of farms in the fruit and vegetable sectors (and more
recently in the meat sector). In order to qualify as a supplier of these
retailers, the farms undertake to comply with HACCP principles
(Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points) and to fulfill their
commitments in order to reduce safety and environmental risks. A
major concern of the EUREPGAP standard is focused on product
traceability, the reduction of chemical residue (in particular pesticides)
and physical and microbial contamination in order to guarantee both
the innocuousness of consumer products, and the protection of natural
resources and workers’ health.
Producers are granted accreditation by external and independent
organizations responsible for audits and verifications. If a supplier is
not able to guarantee compliance with a clause classified as “major”,
its accreditation is temporarily suspended for a period of 6 months
maximum. If beyond this period, compliance is still not fulfilled, its
accreditation is revoked. As a significant number of retailers have
adopted the EUREPGAP standard in some countries, accreditation is
increasingly becoming a condition to access the market for fruit and
vegetable producers.
The EUREPGAP standard generally requires an upgrading of
the farm and therefore an investment, as well as more stringent
production practices, which may result in additional production costs.
This standard, which is applied solely to the B2B part of the activity,
remains unseen by the consumers and is not publicized in any manner
on the final market. In requiring compliance with the EUREPGAP
standard, retailers essentially seek to impose on producers more
stringent requirements than those defined by existing regulations.
However, the development of this standard will be based on the extent
to which the different players include it in their approach.
There are several reasons why some retailers may wish to keep
their own supply chains based on stable agreements and internalverification procedures. External standards and related verification
procedures may only cover a part of the requirements which retailers
seek to apply to their own products. In particular, differentiation
strategies based on the creation of store brands cannot be implemented
on the basis of generic standards. The need to control the logistical
aspects and new product development also encourages the building of
strong vertical alliances. The adoption of external standards may also
result in a cost increase of the product due to more stringent
requirements than those of the public authorities. However, this
increase in cost does not necessarily justify a higher price on the final
market, assuming that the standard is applied only to B2B
relationships and that competing retailers continue to purchase their
supplies on less demanding upstream markets. On the other hand, the
adoption of the EUREPGAP system by a sufficiently great number of
retailers may reduce the risks of food safety crises caused by too low
production standards, and avoid sharp drops in demand, which are
harmful for all retailers in times of crisis periods. In the same way, if
upstream markets were able to offer safe products without retailers
needing to establish restrictive vertical alliances, retailers could more
forcefully take advantage of placing their suppliers in competition
with one another in order to reduce their supply costs.
From a producer’s perspective, the adoption of the EUREPGAP
standard may be beneficial for several reasons. Firstly, the number of
certification procedures is reduced, and therefore so are the related
costs, as only a single standard is applied to retailers committed to
EUREPGAP. Moreover, this approach would in fact become
mandatory if all European retailers were to adopt it. Failure to do so
would lead to exclusion from the market. Nevertheless, the costs
associated with the application of the EUREPGAP standard create
significant difficulties for the producers. These costs mainly stem
from the investments required for the upgrading of production
capacity, working conditions for the personnel, as well as verification
and information monitoring systems.
For the public authorities, if in the future the application of the
EUREPGAP certification standard were to become a required
condition for access to the market, it would in effect act as a MQS
defined by retailers in the private sector. Such an approach could be
beneficial for the public authorities. The costs related to the
verification of minimum quality standards would in fact be borne by
private operators, whereas these costs would be paid by the public
authorities were they to impose the MQS level. However, on the other
hand, there is the risk that the MQS defined solely by the retailers
would not be considered as being at the “appropriate” level in terms of
the general public’s interest.
In order to ascertain the future of these generic standards and
their resulting impact, both on the products sold to consumers and the
producer-retailer relationships, it is important to examine several key
issues. Firstly, what would be the necessary conditions to entice all
retailers to apply this common certification standard? What level of
requirements will they seek to impose on producers, depending on the
number among them which decide to adopt this standard? Can this
certification standard establish itself as a Minimum Quality Standard(MQS)? Should the public authorities intervene in order to influence
the retailers choices? In the following section, we propose a model to
support this discussion.
II.  The Model
The vertical structure is shown in Figure 1. We consider a
vertical relationship between J upstream producers and R downstream
retailers. Each producer (j=1,…,J) sells a quantity q and is price taker 
on two intermediary markets :
- A generic spot market which supplies some retailers at the
intermediary price 
0 ω ,
- A safer spot market which supplies other retailers at price 
1 ω .
Each retailer r (r 1,...,R = ) sells a quantity 
r x  on the final
market, and buys the quantity he needs either on the generic or the
safer spot market.
The final product is considered as an homogeneous product by
the consumers who have the same willingness-to-pay the product
coming from the generic or safer spot market. We consider the
following demand function :
D( p) c dp =−   (c,d >0)                                (1)
Nevertheless, in case of food safety crisis, we consider that the
demand is null. If this crisis occurs with a probability 1 ξ −
(01 ξ ≤≤ ), the expected demand on the final market is
D ( p ) ( c dp )
ξ ξ =−. The demand function is  pab () X ξ =− ,
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Insert Figure 1 : Vertical relationship with both spot market and safe
market
The creation of a safer spot market by m retailers (mR ≤ )
implies a fixed cost C > 0, identical for each retailer (administrative or
control cost for instance). In order to be able to sell on the safer spot
market, the producers must reach a certain level of equipment
imposed by the retailers who buy on the safer spot market. We assumethat the initial equipments of the producers are represented by a one-
dimensional parameter e varying between  e  and e . We assume that
parameter e is uniformly distributed within the interval [e, e]






. Without loss of
generality, we consider that  1 e = . We assume that the producers who
want to sell on the safer spot market are required to adopt a certain
level of equipment 
1 e  and the investment each producer has to realize
is 
1 Max{0,e e } − .
The safety risk probability linked to each individual producer ,
whose equipment level is e, is given by 1( ) e ξ −  with  () e ξ
increasing in. We simply consider that  () ee ξ=  and  () 1 e ξ= . As we
consider that each producer always markets the same quantity q (non
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At the retailer level, a safety crisis leads to a decrease of the final
demand, but also to penalty costs in application of the due diligence
principle. This penalty is supposed to depend on the safety risk
probability and a coefficient Γ such as the retailer profit without a
safer spot market is :
i0 i (p ( , X) w ) x . πξ ξ Γ =− −
with w0  the spot market price paid to the producer.
Benchmark analysis 
In the benchmark situation, only one spot market exists and the
probability of food safety crisis is ½. Calculating the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium between the retailers, we easily obtain the supply on the
final market according to the spot market price paid to the upstream
producers. Then, as all the producers sell the same quantity q on the
spot market, we obtain the equilibrium spot price by equalizing supply
and demand on this intermediary market.  This spot price is :
dR
) R 1 ( q 2 a *
0
+ − = ω





* Γ π− =Safer spot market creation
The issue is now to assess the extension of the safer chain by
the downstream retailers and the upstream producers who have to
adapt their equipments. In order to deal with this issue, we study the
following game:
Step 1 : the retailers decide simultaneously to pay or not the
fixed cost C to enter the safer spot market defined by the safety
standard e1.
Step 2 : the upstream producers decide simultaneously to enter
the safer market and, if necessary adapt their equipments.
 Step 3 : the producers offer the quantity q on the market they
have chosen and the retailers decide simultaneously to supply on the
final market the quantity 
r x  (r=1,…,R).
The creation of the safer market is based on the initial
commitment of some retailers to set up this market (step 1). This
commitment leads the producers to decide to enter or not this market,
and to adapt or not their initial equipments, according to the expected
prices on the safer spot market (step 2). Given the chain structure (i.e.
the number of producers and retailers involved in each spot market),
prices and quantities exchanged on each market are calculated (step
3). The game is solved by backward induction.
Given (
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                 (3)Let’s assume that the G producers who enter the Eurepgap spot
market are involved from the most equipped in the initial situation to
the less equipped in the initial situation.  This means that G is
constituted of producers whose equipment level is initially between
e=1 and a value e ˆ ,  on the left of e1.  Thus, G=1-e ˆ .
Given 0 ω  et  1 ω , all the producers, having an equipment e, who enter
G are such as :
q ) ( e ˆ e 0 1 ω ω− ≤ −
The investments of the producers initially located between e ˆ et  1 e
lead to modify the statistical repartition of producers equipments
(initially uniformly distributed on the interval  ] 1 , 0 [ ). Now, the
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In this case, the non safety risk is :
2
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It is now possible to determine the supply-demand equilibrium on the
intermediary markets (spot and Eurepgap) by taking into account the
risk in the calculation of the quantities marketed by the retailers on the
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ξ ωThe retailers’ profits (in the coalition and in the fringe) depend on the
number of producers and retailers involved in the safer spot market.




















)] e ˆ , e ( - [1    
  ) m R )( e ˆ , e ( d
q e ˆ
) e ˆ , e (
F )] e ˆ , e ( - )[1 e - (1    
  m ) e ˆ , e ( d









The equipment e ˆ is the solution of the following equation:
q )] e ˆ , e ( ) e ˆ , e ( [       e ˆ e 1 0 1 1 ω ω− = −
e ˆ depends on the equipment level chosen by the coalition and the size
of this one. These two variables influence the intermediary prices and
the gap between the two spot markets. This gap finally influences the
level of e ˆ, i.e. the number of producers who accept to join the safer
market.
III. Results and comments
On the basis of the previous section, it is possible to formulate
the following conclusions :
1.  The creation of a spot market based on more stringent
specifications  does not change systematically the
sanitary risk level
The creation of a safer spot market based on more stringent
specifications (has no effect on the total safety risk level if
only the already equipped producers (such as e>e1) enter this
market.
2.   Retailers can reduce the total risk if and only if they pay
more the producers who enter the safer market
If the creation of the safer market is not limited to the already
equipped producers, then the retailers involved in this
procedure are obliged to pay an intermediary price higher than
the generic spot market price (in order to allow investments
among the non equipped producers).3.   In some case, the creation of a safer spot market can be only
seen as an “ insurance” strategy against the
penalty the retailers have to pay when safety crises
occur
If the equipment level required to supply the safer market is low,
many producers, already equipped, are able to enter this
market. In this case, the already equipped producers are
sufficiently numerous to supply the safer market. Like these
producers can accept a lower intermediary spot market price
(because they do not have to invest), the other producers
cannot enter the safer spot market. At the equilibrium, the spot
prices are equal on the two markets and the safety risk is the
same than in the benchmark situation (without safer spot
market). Nevertheless, the retailers can be interested in
implementing the safer spot market, because it can reduce the
individual penalty cost. In other worlds, the creation of a safer
spot market just allow retailers to cover themselves against
future penalties. This market acts as an “insurance” against the
monetary effects of sanitary crisis.
4.  To change the risk level, the participants to the safer market
must be sufficiently numerous
The retailers must impose a sufficiently high level of minimum
equipment to allow non equipped producers to enter the safer
spot market. In this case, the total safety risk can be decreased
relatively to the benchmark situation. This strategy can be
implemented only if a minimum number of retailers (the
initial coalition) are agree to commit themselves in this way.
5.   To change the risk level, the participants to the safer market
must be sufficiently numerous but they have no
interest in the coalition enlargement
The retailers who participate to the initial coalition get a higher
profit than in the benchmark, but their profit decreases if the
coalition size increases. The greater the number of retailers
involved in the coalition, the smaller their profit. The best
would be for them to stay at the minimum coalition size. The
reason is that the intermediary price on the safer spot market
increases as new retailers enter the coalition.
6.  The retailers who stay outside the coalition benefit from the
the coalition size increase (free riding
phenomenon)
When the coalition is stable, the profit of the retailers involved in
the initial coalition is lower than the profit they get for the
minimum coalition size. The profit of the retailers who are
outside the coalition is increasing in the coalition size. It
means that there is a positive externality for the retailers who
stay outside the coalition (they benefit from the decrease in
the total safety risk).7.       The producers non involved in the safer market are penalised
relatively to their own benchmark.
The total safety risk is decreased relatively to the benchmark
situation and the profits of all the retailers and the producers
involved in the safer market are higher than in the benchmark
situation. The profit of non involved producers is decreased
relatively their own benchmark.
8.  The penalty cost is an efficient public instrument to implement
a collective action to create a safer market.
The minimum coalition size depends on the penalty cost. The
greater this penalty, the smaller the minimum size of the
profitable coalition (regarding to the benchmark). Then, the
penalty has as function to facilitate the collective action
(creation of a safer market) by reducing the minimal size of
the “nucleolus” (initial coalition) which may initiate this
action.
9.   The penalty cost is an efficient public instrument to favour
the enlargement of the initial coalition.
If we assume that the retailers of the initial coalition cannot forbid
new entrants incumbents, once the initial coalition and the
new spot market are implemented, other retailers can demand
to enter the coalition. For all the retailers (and if the penalty
costs are median), the profits inside the coalition are always
higher than in the benchmark situation, and higher than
outside the coalition if the coalition size does not exceed a
certain threshold. If the coalition size is equal to this
threshold, the coalition is stable. So a larger coalition than the
initial coalition can be implemented. The size of this stable
coalition depends on several parameters, especially the
penalty cost linked to safety risk. The stable coalition is
compatible with the co-existence of two spot markets.
If we assume that the penalty cost is influenced by the public
authorities, and if they want to reduce the total safety risk,
they have to set up a penalty rule such as : on the one hand,
the penalty cost is sufficiently high in order to decrease the
minimum size of the initial coalition and increase the size of
the stable coalition (at this point, the total risk is lower); on
the other hand, the penalty cost must not be too high because
of a too strong decrease in the retailers’ profit.
If we go back to the Eurepgap example, these results suggest
some remarks. If the certification process and the supplier selection is
such as only the already equipped producers supply the Eurepgap
market, this procedure would have no effect on the total safety risk. In
this case, the spot markets prices would be the same on the both
channels. But some retailers could be interested in this solution
because it decreases the individual penalty in case of crisis.If the spot market price of the Eurepgap market is higher than
the generic spot market price, it means that the retailers coalition is
supplied not only by already equipped producers, but also by
producers who have to invest in a new equipment. In this case, the
total safety risk is decreased relatively to the benchmark situation and
the profits of all the retailers and the producers involved in the
Eurepgap market are higher than in the benchmark situation. The
profit of non involved producers is decreased relatively their own
benchmark.
The progressive entrance of new retailers shows that the
coalition cannot forbid new entrances, despite the fact that it is not in
its interest. If the stability size is not reached yet, new retailers will
enter the coalition. But other retailers can prefer to stay outside and
benefit from a free-riding strategy as their profit increase when the
coalition size increases.Retailers 
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Figure 2: Size of stable coalition
Profit curves in function of the coalition size m: Profit of Retailers belonging to
the safer market of size m (the decreasing curve), Profit of Retailers who join
the fringe and observe a coalition of size (m-1) (increasing curve). Benchmark
profit (linear curve). These curves are valid for m≥4 and the values of
parameters are: a=10, d=5, F=10
-5, q=3, e1=0.7, Γ =0.06







Figure 3: the role of public penalty (for m=4)
Profits curves in function of penalty Γ : Profit of Retailers belonging to the
safer market (the higher curve in the right of the abscise axis), Profit of
Retailers who join the fringe and observe a coalition of size (m-1) (the median
curve in the right of the abscise axis), and the benchmark profit (the lower
curve in the right of the abscise axis). These curves are valid for Γ  ≥0.02 and
the values of parameters are: a=10, d=5, F=10







Figure 4: the variation of the intermediary prices
Intermediary prices curves in function of the coalition size m: Intermediary price on the
safer market of size m (the higher curve in the right of the abscise axis), Intermediary price
in the generic spot market (increasing curve), and benchmark spot market price (the lower
curve in the right of the abscise axis). These curves are valid for m≥4 and the values of
parameters are: a=10, d=5, F=10
-5, q=3, e1=0.7, Γ =0.06